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In definitions written for possible inclusion in the third edition (1726) of Book III of the Principia, Newton 
defined both “body” and “vacuum” in terms of resistance: body is that which gives resistance, vacuum is 
the place in which body can move without resistance. Curiously, Newton is vehement that these 
definitions are not the only possible definitions of body and vacuum, but are merely the ones with which 
he is concerned in the Principia. About “other sorts of bodies and another sort of void”, he writes, “let 
authors in other sciences dispute”. This admission is stunning. Throughout his career—beginning with 
De Gravitatione’s metaphysics of void space as a necessary emanation of God, to the revisions of the 
corporeal transmutation hypothesis of the Principia’s first edition, to the draft definitions mentioned 
above—Newton had struggled with the concepts of body and void. During this time, he had often 
claimed that his concept of body is suited only to the project of the Principia—-other physical theories 
may hypothesize other sorts of bodies—-yet until these draft definitions, he had never done so for the 
concept of void. In fact, in the earlier De Gravitatione, he even portrayed his account of void space as 
the only metaphysically possible one! 
 
By analyzing these draft definitions in conjunction with De Gravitatione and changes in the scholium on 
space and time, I argue that Newton’s notion of absolute, void space underwent a subtle change from 
the time of De Gravitatione to the 1720s. In particular, I argue that Newton started to question whether 
space was necessarily inert. This change implies that Newton was close to rejecting the conception of 
space expressed in De Grav, the same conception that in contemporary literature is often presented as 
the Newtonian view of space. Furthermore, I show that the change in Newton’s conception was due to 
his increased subsumption of the concept of space under the framework of his empiricist methodology, 
a framework according to which the definitions of physical concepts cannot stand independently of and 
prior to the physical theory they found. Newton’s changing concept of void space thus challenges two 
related theses that condition many contemporary accounts of ‘Newtonianism’: First, that Newton’s 
philosophical views did not develop in the course of his career; in particular, that De Gravitatione 
expresses Newton’s mature Neo-Platonist-inspired metaphysics. And second, that Newton was a 
uncompromising absolutist about space until his dying day, i.e., that he intended to draw necessary and 
metaphysical conclusions about the nature of space from his physical theory. 
 
These claims are supported by two threads of argumentation. First, I show that Newton’s conception of 
space in both De Gravitatione and the scholium to the definitions of the Principia was supported by two 
mostly independent sets of arguments: one concern among the geometrical structure of space and its 
necessity for a coherent physical theory, and the other concerning the lack of agency of space. Although 
the two sets of arguments are intertwined in Newton’s presentation and constitute the “standard” view 
of Newtonian space-time, they are methodologically independent. While the first concerns the 
conceptual basis of the fundamental concepts of physical theory (e.g., velocity of motion, time of 
motion, etc.), the second concerns direct empirical evidence regarding the vacuity of the celestial spaces 
and the aetherial resistance encountered by projectiles. Because of this methodological independence, 
when in the 1710s Newton came to doubt the validity of his arguments concerning the vacuity of the 
celestial spaces (expressed in revisions to Prop. 6 of Book III of the Principia), he could question whether 
space was necessarily inert without questioning space’s necessity and essentially geometrical structure. 
This comprised Newton’s first move towards the rejection of his earlier concept of space. However, even 
if Newton’s two sets of arguments were methodologically independent, they were not independent in 
substance. Their link centers on the necessity of space for physical theory. Through the first set of 
arguments, Newton showed that the geometrical structure of absolute space is conceptually necessary 
for the basic concepts of physical theory. However, it is through the second set of arguments that 
Newton showed that space is “neither substance nor accident” and so ontologically necessary, i.e., a 
necessary emanation of God. Consequently, I argue, Newton’s doubts concerning the agency of space 
directly undermine De Gravitatione’s conception of space as both conceptually and ontologically 
necessary. 
 
The second thread of argumentation concerns Newton’s preferred method of reasoning in natural 
philosophy. From De Gravitatione to the drafts of the third edition of the Principia, Newton held that his 
preferred method is “the method of the geometers”. On this method, terms in natural philosophy ought 
to be used only in accordance with their precise definitions. Their vulgar use, if it exists, ought to be 
ignored. However, as I will show, in De Gravitatione and the scholium to the definitions Newton 
consciously avoided using this method in his treatment of space. In fact, he explicitly held that since 
“time, space, place, and motion” are “very well known to all”, he shall not define them! Rather, in order 
to treat space Newton followed a more common mode of natural philosophical argumentation: he took 
a familiar (if not precise) concept and showed through a series of arguments what could and could not 
be properly said of it. It is as part of this strategy that Newton discussed the necessity, geometrical 
character, and lack of agency of space. For Newton, these were characteristics of space that had been 
tacitly assumed by all previous commentators, although previous commentators had not always come 
to see them clearly. For Newton, his concept of space was thus the same as that of his predecessors, but 
cleansed of their errors and misconceptions. Yet Newton’s treatment of space changed radically in the 
1710s. During this period, after coming to doubt the agency of space, Newton came to believe that void 
space itself (along with body) must be subjected to “the method of the geometers”. On Newton’s 
understanding of this method, however, foundational theoretical terms (like “space”) are not defined a 
priori. Rather, they are defined through the machinery of a posteriori physical theory and gain their 
foundational status by their role in that theory. It is because Newton began to bring his concept of space 
under this general methodology that the concept ceased (for him) to have a general, metaphysical 
application, and be limited to discussions bounded by the framework of the Principia. 
 
By considering Newton’s method of defining concepts in natural philosophy and its intertwining with his 
changing views on the nature of space, I aim to portray Newton as a historically developing philosopher. 
Precisely, I aim to show that although in his De Gravitatione he was a “hardcore” absolutist, his position 
regarding the metaphysical necessity of space evolved to be much weaker than it is usually supposed to 
be. 
 
